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Abstract— The use of microprocessor-based systems is gaining 
importance in application domains where safety is a must. For 
this reason, there is a growing concern about the mitigation of 
SEU and SET effects. This paper presents a new hybrid 
technique aimed to protect both the data and the control-flow of 
embedded applications running on microprocessors. On one 
hand, the approach is based on software redundancy techniques 
for correcting errors produced in the data. On the other hand, 
control-flow errors can be detected by reusing the on-chip debug 
interface, existing in most modern microprocessors. 
Experimental results show an important increase in the system 
reliability even superior to two orders of magnitude, in terms of 
mitigation of both SEUs and SETs. Furthermore, the overheads 
incurred by our technique can be perfectly assumable in low-cost 
systems. 
 
Index Terms— Single Event Transient, Single Event Upset, 
microprocessor, fault tolerance, soft error. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE use of microprocessor-based systems is gaining 
importance in application domains where safety is a must. 
In this case, errors induced by radiation in the microprocessor 
may cause wrong computations or even losing control of the 
entire system. Therefore, mitigation of Single-Event Effects 
(SEE) is mandatory in safety- or mission-critical applications. 
SEEs, such as Single-Event Upsets (SEUs) or Single-Event 
Transients (SETs), may affect microprocessors in several 
ways. If an error occurs in a register or memory position 
storing data, a wrong computation result may be obtained. If 
an error occurs in a control register, such as the program 
counter or the stack pointer, the instruction flow may be 
corrupted and a wrong result may be produced or the 
processor may lose control and enter an infinite loop. Both 
data and control-flow errors need to be carefully addressed by 
software and hardware error mitigation techniques. 
Software-based approaches have been proposed for both 
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data and control-flow errors. For data errors, software 
approaches apply redundancy at low level (assembly code) 
[1], [2], [3] or high-level source code by means of automatic 
transformation rules [4]. Also, multithreading has been applied 
to implement software detection and recovery solutions to 
mitigate faults [5]. Control-flow checking techniques are 
typically based on signature monitoring [6]-[11]. The program 
is divided into a set of branch-free blocks, where each block is 
a set of consecutive instructions with no branches except for 
possibly the last one. A reference signature is calculated at 
compile time and stored in the system for each block. During 
operation, a run-time signature is calculated and compared 
with the reference signature to detect control-flow errors. 
Hardware-based approaches can be used for 
microprocessors at several abstraction levels as for any other 
digital device. Microprocessor specific techniques introduce 
system level redundancy by using multiple processors, 
coprocessors or specialized system modules [12]-[15]. In 
particular, the reuse of debug infrastructures has recently been 
proposed [16]. Debug infrastructures are intended to support 
debugging during the development phase, and are very 
common in modern microprocessors. As they are useless 
during normal operation, they can be easily reused for on-line 
monitoring in an inexpensive way [17]. On the other hand, 
they can provide internal access to the microprocessor without 
disturbing it, and require neither processor nor software 
modifications.  
Both hardware and software-based techniques have 
advantages and disadvantages. The software-based approaches 
are very flexible and can be used with Commercial Off-The-
Shelf (COTS) microprocessors, because no internal 
modifications to the microprocessor are required. However, 
they may produce large overheads in processing time and 
storage needs [18], [19]. These can be particularly very large 
for control-flow checking, because a large amount of 
signatures need to be stored and checked very often. To the 
contrary, hardware-based techniques can be quite effective but 
they usually introduce large area overheads and generally 
require modifications on the microprocessor, which are not 
feasible in COTS. However, these drawbacks can be 
overcome by reusing the debug infrastructures, as they use 
existing hardware interfaces in a non-intrusive manner. 
This paper presents a new hybrid technique aimed to protect 
both the data and the control-flow of embedded applications 
running on microprocessors. On one hand, the approach is 
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based on software redundancy techniques for correcting the 
errors produced in the data. On the other hand, control-flow is 
checked by a small hardware module that monitors the 
sequence of instructions executed by the processor through the 
debug interface and detects illegal changes in the control flow. 
Contrarily to other hybrid approaches, the proposed approach 
does not require additional information to be stored internally 
or to be sent to the external hardware module in order to detect 
control-flow errors. Thus, the overheads incurred by our 
technique are only caused by data error correction and can be 
perfectly assumable in low-cost systems. The experimental 
results show an important increase in the system reliability 
even superior to two orders of magnitude, in terms of 
mitigation of both SEU and SET effects. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews other 
related works. Section III describes the proposed hybrid 
hardening approach. Section IV shows the experimental 
results. Finally, Section V summarizes the conclusions of this 
work. 
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS 
Error detection techniques for microprocessor-based 
systems can be classified into three categories [20]: software-
based techniques, hardware-based techniques and hybrid 
techniques. 
Software-based techniques exploit the concepts of 
information, operation and time redundancy to detect or 
correct errors during program execution. These techniques are 
usually implemented by automatically applying a set of 
transformation rules to the source code [21]. Two types of 
errors are generally distinguished: data-flow errors, which 
affect data computations, and control-flow errors, which affect 
the correct order of instruction execution. Techniques for data-
flow error detection are typically based on instruction and data 
duplication and comparison [22]. For control-flow errors, 
there is variety of techniques which are based on assertions 
[9], [10] or signatures [3], [11].  
Control-flow checking techniques usually divide the 
program into Branch-free Blocks (BBs), where each block is a 
set of consecutive instructions with no branches except for 
possibly the last one. A reference signature is calculated at 
compile time and stored in the system for each block. During 
operation, a run-time signature is calculated and compared 
with the reference signature to detect control-flow errors. 
Alternatively, special instructions are introduced in the code to 
assert the beginning and end of each BB. The computation and 
checking of signatures or assertions usually introduce large 
overheads. On the other hand, control flow checking 
techniques have not yet achieved full fault tolerance [14]. 
Hardware-based techniques use hardware modifications or 
hardware extensions for error detection. Because modifying 
the microprocessor is generally very costly, the preferred 
approach consists in adding an external module to monitor the 
control-flow of the execution. This approach is compatible 
with the use of COTS. The external module is often called a 
watchdog processor [12].  
A watchdog processor can detect control-flow errors by 
either executing a program concurrently with the main 
processor (active watchdog processor) or by computing the 
signatures of the BBs and comparing them with the expected 
ones (passive watchdog processor). In the active case, the 
overhead is very large because the watchdog processor is 
almost a real processor [23], [24]. In the passive case, the 
watchdog processor is small, but it requires a large amount of 
memory to store the signatures of the BBs. In addition, the 
code must be modified to let the watchdog processor know 
when the program reaches or leaves a block. Thus, code size 
and performance overheads increase.  
For data errors, a watchdog processor can only perform 
some limited checks, such as checks for access to unexpected 
data addresses [25] or range checks for some critical variables 
[26]. As variable checking increases the complexity of the 
watchdog processor, algorithms to select the most critical 
variables must be used, such as [27] or [28].  
The watchdog processor must be connected to the bus 
between the memory and the microprocessor in order to 
monitor the instruction and data flows. This may pose some 
difficulties, particularly if cache memories are used, because 
the cache interface is usually critical or may not be available. 
The use of debug infrastructures has recently been proposed as 
a alternative way to observe microprocessor execution [16]. 
Debug infrastructures are intended to support debugging 
during the development phase, and are very common in 
modern microprocessors. As they are useless during normal 
operation, they can be easily reused for on-line monitoring in 
an inexpensive way [17]. On the other hand, they can provide 
internal access to the microprocessor without disturbing it. In 
[16] the debug infrastructure is used to get the most relevant 
information of the execution combined with time or hardware 
redundancy. However, this approach requires at least a full 
duplication of the execution of the program. This provides full 
error detection but the error detection latency is very high, 
because errors can only be detected after the full program has 
been executed twice. Control-flow checking through the 
debug interface has been preliminarily explored in [29]. This 
work does not deal with data errors and results are reported 
only for SEUs with small fault injection campaigns.  
Hybrid techniques combine both software and hardware 
fault tolerance techniques in order to take advantage of the 
benefits that each technique can provide. A reconfiguration-
based approach is proposed in [15]. This approach requires 
switching to an application-specific module for every 
application program. In [30] a hybrid approach is proposed 
which uses an Infrastructure IP (I-IP). The I-IP checks both 
the control-flow and the data-flow, but the original source 
code must be modified to support both types of checks. In 
addition to data instruction duplication, special function calls 
are inserted at the beginning and at the end of each BB. A 
similar approach is proposed in [8], where the original code is 
extended to send either block identifiers or block signatures to 
the watchdog processor. The watchdog processor manages a 
queue of block identifiers, computes the on-line block 
signatures and checks for any inconsistency with the correct 
expected result. This approach can reach 100% fault detection 
in the fault injection campaign, but at high costs of 
performance and area occupation. Moreover, this technique 
has limitations concerning its scalability to applications with 
large quantities of jump instructions [14]. To solve this 
problem, the authors propose an improved control-flow 
checking approach based in assertions in [14]. This approach 
presents the limitation that it cannot be applied with on-chip 
cache memories. Finally, different hybrid approaches, based 
on selective hardening, are evaluated in terms of execution 
time and memory overheads and fault detection capability in 
[18] and [19]. But the presented hybrid solutions are intrusive, 
meaning that the microprocessor used must be redesigned. 
III. HYBRID HARDENING APPROACH 
The approach proposed in this work relies on the use of a 
Control-Flow Checking (CFC) module that monitors the 
execution of the microprocessor without disturbing it, while 
data errors are corrected by using software techniques. The 
CFC module observes the microprocessor execution through 
the trace interface, which provides improved observability of 
the control-flow.  
This interface is commonly directly accessible in modern 
processors (Standard Nexus, class 2, 3 and 4, [31]). It allows  
designers to control execution and access internal resources 
from outside the system, as well as to trace program and data.  
The trace interface can be accessed directly on-chip or off-
chip through some standard port such as JTAG. In our case, 
we use a direct access. The observation of internal data is done 
in a non-intrusive way and it does not affect the performance 
of the processor. The information that can be obtained from 
the trace interface usually includes the value of the program 
counter, the operation code (opcode), instruction results, load 
data and store data. A detailed analysis of the trace interface 
for several processors can be found in [16]. In comparison, 
CFC techniques that use a watchdog processor observe the 
processor operation through the microprocessor or system bus. 
In this case, the address and opcode of the instructions are 
observed at the fetch stage, i.e., just before the instruction is 
executed. 
Contrarily to other hybrid approaches, the proposed 
approach use neither signatures nor assertions to detect 
control-flow errors. Instead, a program counter prediction 
technique is used which does not require additional 
information to be stored internally or to be sent to the external 
hardware module. Therefore, control-flow error detection adds 
neither memory nor performance overhead.  
Hardware-based control-flow checking is combined with 
software-based data error correction to provide a complete 
approach. Experimental results include both SEU and SET 
fault injection. The proposed approach is described in the 
following sections. 
A.  Data Hardening 
Two software-based techniques are proposed in this work to 
be applied in different scenarios according to the maximum 
response time allowed, and the performance and code size 
constraints. Both of them are applied at low-level code 
(assembly) but with different granularity levels.  
The first one is an adaptation of the SWIFT-R technique 
proposed by Reis et al. [32]. SWIFT-R is an overall method 
aimed to recover faults from the data section, mainly related to 
the register file of the microprocessor. Similar to hardware 
TMR, the idea is to keep two copies of any data that come into 
the software protected area (also called Sphere of Replication 
or SoR). In our case, the borders of SoR include the entire 
microprocessor data-path excluding the memory and ports. 
Every instruction that operates with the data is replicated too. 
Finally, to check the consistency of the data, software majority 
voters and recovery procedures are inserted before any 
instruction that implies the data leaves the SoR (e.g., store into 
a memory location or write to an output port), and also before 
any conditional branch. 
Fig. 1 presents an example of a basic program hardened 
using SWIFT-R (assembly code). Notice that register copies 
(s0’, s0’’, . . . ) are stored in other available registers from the 
microprocessor register file, i.e., unused registers in the 
original program. Furthermore, majority voters are recovery 
procedures that compare if at least two versions of a register 
have the same value, correcting a possible corrupted data 
using the third copy. 
Any soft-error affecting the program data within the 
microprocessor is masked by the copies and corrected in a 
short term. Data correction lasts the number of clock cycles 
necessary to execute the instructions of the voter and the 
recovery of the affected register. However, because of its fine 
replication granularity (instruction level) the code size and the 
execution time can be increased from 2.5 to 3 times compared 
to the non-hardened program [33]. Therefore, this method 
represents a suitable solution when a quick recovery time is 
needed and there are no severe overhead limitations. 
 
 
Figure 1. Code example of data hardening using SWIFT-R 
  
The second method is based on Procedural Replication (PR) 
instead of instruction replication. The replication unit is the 
procedure (function), which is a block of code that performs a 
single task and returns some values. Every procedure is 
computed twice and recomputed a third time if a discrepancy 
between the previous two computations occurs [34]. Fig. 2 
illustrates this approach. 
 
 
Figure 2. Data hardening using Procedural Replication (PR) 
 
To obtain this behavior, a few code transformations are 
needed in the original code, involving conditional jumps and 
consistency checkers (inserted after procedure calls). Thus, the 
impact in code size is, a priori, small. In contrast, the recovery 
time is much longer for this second technique than for 
SWIFT-R. It depends on the number of instructions included 
in the procedure’s duplicated call. Usually, the recovery time 
is equal to the total execution time of the original procedure 
plus a few additional comparisons. The recovery time is, 
therefore, a significant issue that must be taken into account 
with this method. Nonetheless, as the third procedure call only 
occurs in case of error detection, the execution time overhead 
factor during normal operation of the system (error-free state) 
is only 2 times. Otherwise, in the unlikely event of error 
recovery, this overhead is up to 3 times.  
B. Control Flow Checking 
The hybrid approach presented in this paper performs 
Control-Flow Checking (CFC) by adding a dedicated 
hardware module (CFC module). The module accesses to 
internal resources by means of the debug infrastructure 
available in modern microprocessors (Fig. 3). Debug 
Infrastructures support software debugging in embedded 
system development. As they are useless during normal 
operation, they can be easily reused for online monitoring in 
an inexpensive way. In addition, they can provide internal 
access to the processor without disturbing it and do not require 
any modification neither to the hardware nor to the software 
(i.e. no performance penalties are experimented).  
The debug interface provides access to the trace buffer, 
which stores the most relevant information of the executed 
instruction, such as the instruction address, program counter 
(PC), instruction code (opcode), trap and error flags, etc. The 
trace buffer is located in the processor and read out through 
the trace interface. Generally, CFC techniques only observe 
the opcode and the program counter of the instruction just 
before the instruction is executed, because they normally 
observe the processor operation through the cache or system 
bus. With this approach, internal errors cannot be easily 
detected unless they produce a wrong sequence of instructions, 
because the information is observed in the fetch stage. 
However, it is possible to observe the system behavior 
completely with the information provided by the trace 
interface right after the instruction is executed without 
modifying the normal microprocessor operation or adding any 
performance penalties.  
The microprocessor utilized in this work does not provide a 
debug infrastructure. However, an implementation of a debug 
infrastructure similar to [35] has been accomplished to 
validate the proposed approach. The implemented instruction 
trace interface provides the program counter (PC), instruction 
code (opcode) and the trap flag. This information is monitored 
on-line by the CFC module for every executed instruction. 
 
 
Figure 3. System structure hardened with a CFC-Module 
 
The operation of the proposed CFC module consists on 
predicting the next Program Counter (PC) value, starting from 
the opcode of the executed instruction, and comparing it with 
the actual PC value for the next executed instruction. If there 
is any difference, an error in the execution flow is detected. 
Fig. 4 shows the prediction algorithm for the next program 
counter within the CFC module. When a non-branch 
instruction is considered, the program counter must be 
incremented by the size of the instruction. When a branch 
instruction is considered, the program counter must either be 
incremented by the branch offset if the branch is taken, or be 
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This technique has preliminarily been explored in [29], 
obtaining a good trade-off between the fault detection 
coverage and area overhead. In order to apply this technique, 
the value of the PC and operation code of the current executed 
instruction must be accessible. These values are generally 
present in trace interfaces, and therefore, this technique is 
applicable to those processors that contain a trace bus. Fig. 5 
shows the structure of the CFC module.  
 
Figure 5.Block diagram to show the CFC module structure 
 
The CFC module consists of three blocks:  
• PC Checker: it compares the predicted PC value with 
the actual one.  
• N-level Stack Replica: this block replicates N stack 
positions in order to check the control flow in case of 
call and return from subroutines.  
• Manager: this block is in charge of three main tasks: 
decoding the executed instruction, predicting the PC 
value for the next instruction and managing the other 
blocks. 
The PC prediction value of the next instruction to be 
executed takes into account branch and non-branch 
instructions, distinguishing between conditional and 
unconditional branches. Furthermore, when a subroutine is 
called, the return PC value is stored in the N-level Stack 
Replica. Thus, when a return instruction is executed, the 
predicted PC value for the next instruction can be recovered 
from that block and checked. A suitable trade-off between 
necessary hardware resources and error coverage can be 
achieved by selecting the number of stack positions to be 
replicated. For applications with low level of nested 
subroutines, a few stack positions should be replicated. In this 
paper, the experimental results have been performed with 3 
replicated positions (3-Level Stack Replica). 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
To assess the effectiveness of our approach, we have 
performed extensive SEU and SET experiments in a 
PicoBlaze microprocessor considering several software 
applications and different combinations of software and 
hardware hardening techniques. 
In the experiments, we adopted the approach proposed in 
[36]. This approach demonstrates that the dynamic cross-
section (𝜏𝑆𝐸𝑈) can be calculated as the product of the static 
cross-section (𝜎𝑆𝐸𝑈) and the global error rate (𝜏𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐹𝐼): 
𝜏𝑆𝐸𝑈 =  𝜎𝑆𝐸𝑈 ∗  𝜏𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐹𝐼  
where 𝜏𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐹𝐼  is obtained by emulation-based fault injection. 
Because the static cross-section 𝜎𝑆𝐸𝑈 is the same for all the 
hardened versions of the circuit, relative comparisons can be 
made in terms of the global error rate 𝜏𝑁𝐸𝑇𝐹𝐼 . To obtain the 
global error rate, we used the AMUSE tool [37], which is an 
evolved version of the NETFI tool [36]. In relation to test 
coverage, as described in [38], AMUSE typically provides 
100% coverage of expected radiation test results with respect 
to fault locations, input vectors and clock cycles of operation 
for small or medium-size test cases. On the other hand, fault 
injection allows us to perform a more detailed analysis of the 
hardening approaches. 
We worked with a compiler front-end and back-end for 
PicoBlaze microprocessor in order to generate the hardened 
software versions. PicoBlaze is a soft-microprocessor based 
on a RISC architecture of 8 bits, with severe limitations in 
performance and resources, but widely used in FPGA-based 
embedded systems. These facts make it especially appropriate 
for our case study, taking into account that PicoBlaze is 
mainly found in cost sensitive applications.  
The PicoBlaze architecture contains 16 general-purpose 8-
bit registers, and separate memories for data (internal 64bytes 
scrachtpad RAM) and code (1024words ROM). It also 
includes a stack memory (31words) to support subroutine calls 
and up to 256 input and output ports. In the multi-cycle 
implementation of Picoblaze all the instructions take the same 
number of cycles to be executed, namely two cycles. In 
addition to the general-purpose register file, PicoBlaze has 
other internal register such as the Program Counter (PC) and 
the Stack Pointer (SP).  Because these internal registers are not 
accessible by software instructions, control-flow error 
detection is difficult to perform by software-based techniques. 
In this case study, a cycle accurate and RTL equivalent 
clone of the original PicoBlaze-3 version (RTLPicoBlaze) has 
been used. The PicoBlaze design has been extended with a 
trace interface, similar to the one that can be found for LEON3 
[35], and the CFC module has been connected to it. Table I 
summarizes the synthesis results. The CFC module implies an 
overhead of 435 gates and 119 FFs. This corresponds to an 
area overhead of about 40% because PicoBlaze is a very small 
microprocessor. For more complex microprocessors, the 
overhead can be expected to be much smaller. The CFC 
module does not affect the maximum operation frequency of 
the processor. 
 
TABLE I. SYNTHESIS RESULTS 
 #Gates #FFs 
Max Freq  
(MHz) 
Microprocessor 1066 194 350 
CFC 435 119 670 
 
The architecture was synthesized for a 90 nm technology 
using the SAED90 nm library provided by Synopsys [39]. For 
SEU experiments, we injected SEUs at every FF and clock 










random instants within every clock cycle for every gate and 
with a pulse width of 500 ps (approximately 20% of the clock 
period), using the approach described in [40]. The number of 
injected faults varies with the software application and the 
selected hardening techniques. It ranges from 17,483 
faults/node to 105,344 faults/node (up to 111 million faults in 
total for SETs and up to 20 million faults in total for SEUs). 
All nodes are fault injected. Then, for each node, we generate 
a list of fault injection instants with a random time interval 
between two consecutive injection instants. The mean of this 
random time interval is 500 ps (equal to the pulse width). The 
clock period is 2.67 ns. Therefore, 5.3 faults are injected in 
every clock cycle on average and we can ensure that all clock 
cycles are covered for SETs. 
In the experiments, faults were classified according to their 
effect on the program behavior as proposed in [41]. Silent 
Data Corruption (SDC) failures are faults that have not been 
detected or corrected and make the program finish with an 
erroneous output. Hang failures are the ones that provoke 
abnormal program termination or an infinite loop. To detect 
this type of failures, we established a timeout condition with 
some allowed extra clock cycles for the computation to 
complete correctly (the timeout value depends on the 
application and the software hardening technique, ranging 
from 100 to 3300 clock cycles for the performed experiments).  
Three different software applications were used for the 
experiments: matrix multiplication (Mmult), a Proportional-In 
tegral-Derivative Controller (PID) and a Finite Impulse 
Response filter (FIR). In the experiments, we tested every 
application with no hardening at all (NH) and hardened with 
SWIFT-R (SR), Procedural Replication (PR) and all of the 
above combined with CFC (NH+CFC, SR+CFC and 
PR+CFC).  
Tables III and IV summarize the results for SEUs and SETs, 
respectively. The percentage of SDC and HANG failures are 
reported for all the software versions: 3 benchmarks (Mmult, 
PID and FIR), non hardened versions (NH) and 2 different 
software hardening techniques (SR and PR), with and without 
CFC module.  
The experimental results demonstrate that the combination 
of SW hardening for data errors and HW hardening for 
control-flow errors is able to mitigate almost all errors. 
Generally, the CFC module removes most Hang errors and the 
SR or PR techniques remove most SDC errors, but both 
techniques are required to produce a relevant mitigation. The 
best results are achieved with the combination of PR and CFC 
module. The last column in Tables III and IV shows the 
relative error rate reduction that is obtained in this case with 
respect to the NH version. This reduction can be as large as 
114 times, i.e., more than 2 orders of magnitude, in the FIR 
case.  
When selecting a software technique, it must be taken into 
account that the studied software techniques require different 
recovery times and memory overheads. SWIFT-R is less 
effective than PR and it also introduces higher code and 
execution time overheads, as reported in Table II.  
 










Mmult 3304 SR 3.02× 2.55× 




PID 7390 SR 2.37× 2.65× 
  PR 1.24× 2.02× 
FIR 7374 SR 2.85× 2.68× 
  PR 1.07× 1.96× 
 
 
In contrast, PR has significant recovery times (ranging from 
590 to 3300 clock cycles for the considered benchmarks), 
while the recovery time for SWIFT-R is negligible. 
Finally, Table V shows a summary comparison with some 
of the hybrid techniques reported in Section II. The results 
shown in Table V are taken from the papers referenced in the 
first column. The proposed technique does not require 
software modifications for control-flow error detection. Thus, 
the execution time overhead is only due to data hardening. 
When the SR technique is used, the overhead is slightly larger 
because it includes both data error detection and recovery. 
Code size overhead is smaller or similar. The approaches 
differ in the fault injection techniques: [30] uses software fault 
injection, while [8], [14] and [16] inject faults directly in the 
signals of the microprocessor VHDL code. In contrast, we 
inject into every node of the final synthesized netlist and 
consider the real delays as estimated by the synthesis tool.  
With respect to error detection, our results are close to 100%, 
but the fault injection experiments are much larger and more 
accurate. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
An efficient SEU and SET mitigation approach for 
embedded applications running on microprocessors has been 
proposed that combines software-based techniques for data 
errors and non-intrusive hardware-based techniques for 
control-flow errors. The results demonstrate that up to two 
orders of magnitude of improvement in the soft error rate can 
be achieved with this approach. 
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TABLE III. SEU FAULT INJECTION RESULTS 
Benchmark Error Type NH SR PR NH+CFC SR+CFC PR+CFC Rel. Red. 
Mmult SDC (%) 9.65% 2.92% 0.30% 8.43% 2.18% 0.15%   
  Hang (%) 6.94% 4.74% 4.98% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%   
  TOTAL (%) 16.59% 7.66% 5.28% 8.43% 2.18% 0.15% 113 × 
PID SDC (%) 12.97% 4.73% 0.80% 10.51% 2.18% 0.15%   
  Hang (%) 7.77% 5.27% 5.73% 1.95% 0.09% 1.25%   
  TOTAL (%) 20.74% 10.00% 6.53% 12.47% 2.28% 1.40% 15 × 
FIR SDC (%) 12.39% 3.21% 0.88% 9.91% 0.69% 0.15%   
  Hang (%) 5.55% 5.20% 4.79% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%   
  TOTAL (%) 17.94% 8.41% 5.67% 9.91% 0.69% 0.16% 114 × 
 
 
TABLE IV. SET FAULT INJECTION RESULTS 
Benchmark Error Type NH SR PR NH+CFC SR+CFC PR+CFC Rel. Red. 
Mmult SDC (%) 0.83% 0.30% 0.05% 0.17% 0.16% 0.02%   
  Hang (%) 0.90% 0.61% 0.76% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%   
  TOTAL (%) 1.73% 0.91% 0.80% 0.17% 0.16% 0.02% 78 × 
PID SDC (%) 1.30% 0.64% 0.05% 0.85% 0.16% 0.01%   
  Hang (%) 1.18% 0.93% 0.95% 0.14% 0.01% 0.10%   
  TOTAL (%) 2.48% 1.56% 1.00% 0.98% 0.17% 0.11% 22 × 
FIR SDC (%) 1.20% 0.56% 0.12% 0.74% 0.07% 0.02%   
  Hang (%) 1.04% 0.92% 0.92% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%   
  TOTAL (%) 2.24% 1.48% 1.04% 0.74% 0.07% 0.02% 114 × 
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